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Collective and individual voice:
convergence in Europe?
Chris Brewster, Richard Croucher, Geoff Wood and Michael
Brookes
Abstract This paper uses longitudinal survey data from Britain, Germany and Sweden to
examine whether, as some researchers have suggested, there has been a convergence
internationally towards individual forms of employee voice mechanism and, if so, to
measure the extent and trajectory of change. The paper begins by examining the importance
of the employee voice issue. It then reviews competing accounts of the utility of different
forms of employee voice and their manifestations within different varieties of capitalism. It
is hypothesized that there has been a general trend away from collective and towards
individual voice mechanisms; this reflects the predominant trajectory of managerial
practices towards convergence with the liberal market model. This hypothesis is largely
rejected. The data showed only very limited evidence of directional convergence towards
individual voice models in the three countries. Collective voice remains significant in
larger organizations, and although it takes a wide range of forms that include but go beyond
unions and works councils, this is a positive finding for proponents of those institutions.
Keywords Individual voice mechanisms; participation and involvement; varieties of
capitalism; regulation theory.
Introduction
This paper uses survey data to examine whether, as often suggested, a convergence
towards individual forms of employee voice mechanism in Britain, Germany and
Sweden has occurred. It therefore contributes to debates about the nature and extent of
convergence in HR practices within European organizations. The three countries fall
within different ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001) or different ‘business
systems’ (Whitley, 1999). Britain is generally held to be an archetypical example of a
liberal market economy and while both Germany and Sweden represent examples of
more collaborative systems, the latter incorporates a stronger social dimension. Sweden
also exhibited a stronger macro-economic performance in the 1990s and early 2000s
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and the Swedish context may be more favourable to those seeking to resist pressures
towards the individualization of workplace practices.
The paper is structured as follows. We begin by examining reasons for the importance
of the employee voice issue and then review competing accounts of the utility of different
forms of employee voice and their manifestations within different varieties of capitalism.
We discuss the nature of ‘convergence’ and ‘divergence’. We hypothesize a trend away
from collective and towards individual voice mechanisms. International survey data are
then deployed to test this hypothesis and, finally, theoretical conclusions are drawn.
The importance of voice
Why is voice, as originally defined and discussed by Hirschman (1970) important within
organizations? In the classical industrial relations literature, employee participation and
involvement were located in equity terms, and involvement was seen as positive in
promoting fairness at the workplace (Flanders, 1980; Fox, 1980; Woodall and
Winstanley, 2001). In contrast, within the human relations tradition (e.g. Mayo, 1945),
efficiency arguments were advanced and involvement was seen primarily in terms of
motivation by enhancing perceptions of the firm as a community (Adams, 2005). The
latter themes were echoed in subsequent HRM literature that also saw participation and
involvement in efficiency terms but without the human relations tradition’s humanist
conceptions (Woodall and Winstanley, 2001). Their argument was underpinned by neo-
classical assumptions that unions distorted the efficient operation of labour markets by
inflating wages (Woodall and Winstanley, 2001). This meant that, at best, a trade-off
occurs between increased wage costs on the one hand and possible transactional benefits
on the other. At worst, unions were held to jeopardize competitiveness, and to exacerbate
unemployment (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). The assumptions of the neo-classically
based efficiency or business case viewpoint are less relevant currently than hitherto
because the union wage premium appears to have greatly diminished in Europe. It has
been suggested that the union membership wage premium disappeared in 1990s Britain
(Forth and Millward, 2000). More recent work has shown that it persists there, although
diminished (Bryson, 2002) while analysis of the most recent population data for the USA
showed its persistence at a higher level there in the early 1990s (Budd and Na, 2000).
The viewpoint advanced by neo-classical business authors also has several theoretical
limitations, as Kaufman (2004) explains. First, rationality is bounded – decision making
is affected by limited cognition, imperfect information and emotion. Effective voice
mechanisms can make exchange relations more efficient. Second, the costs of exit are
particularly high for certain categories of labour, making voice mechanisms of great
importance. Finally, no employment contract can be complete; voice mechanisms can
help problems and issues to be identified and resolved.
More recent work has pointed to the central role of voice not only in terms of ensuring
greater fairness within the workplace, but also as an essential foundation of a democratic
society; at best, it gives workers a real say in corporate governance (Budd, 2004;
Martens, 1992). Interestingly, Budd argues that this should be seen as distinct from both
efficiency and equity concerns. While voice may impact efficiency and equity, it
represents a moral imperative in its own right (Adams, 2005; Budd, 2004).
Forms of voice, participation and involvement
Collective voice includes all mechanisms based on employee collectives and, therefore,
encompasses but is more than a synonym for trade unions and Joint Consultative
Committees or Works Councils. Individual voice may be expressed through briefing groups,
Brewster et al.: Collective and individual voice 1247
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problem-solving teams, regular meetings between management and the workforce at large,
written forms of communication including newsletters and via notice boards, electronic
communication including intranet and emails (including e-mail-administered employee
surveys) and suggestion schemes (Bryson, 2004). Although these are sometimes
categorized into union or management friendly forms (Colvin, 2004), practices exist that
are harder to demarcate outside of power relations contexts. However, practices may be
grouped by dimension (whether based on collective or individual voice) and depth (i.e. the
extent to which a practice is likely to influence management decision making).
At the most modest level involvement entails consultation, or soliciting of opinions
that may or may not be acted on, rather than bargaining (Wood, 1998). In contrast,
participation accords employees a genuine – clearly demarcated – input into how the
firm is governed, even if this input is limited. Examples of employee involvement include
briefings or meetings where information is communicated by management and feedback
solicited. While the latter constitute forums for individual voice, consultation can assume
a collective dimension. The position is summarized in Figure 1.
For its proponents, individual voice allows firms to take account of the diverse needs
of the modern workforce (Bryson, 2004). Conservative accounts have suggested that it
allows closer and more direct communication between managers and other members of
the organization, unmediated by unions or other interposing interests (Reddish, 1980:
298–301). However, collective voice allows workers greater freedom to table concerns
without fear of victimization (Harcourt et al., 2004). It may enhance productivity by
reducing turnover; given the greater depth of collective voice, employees have less need
to express concerns by quitting (Kaufman, 2004). It provides an essential mechanism for
resolution of collective and individual problems arising from flexible working (Singe and
Croucher, 2003). Management may restrict the depth of individual voice for fear of it
assuming a collective dimension; in a unionized environment, managers are already
reconciled to this possibility, and have reformulated their standpoint accordingly
(Kaufman, 2004). Finally, collective voice mechanisms may increase productivity
directly (see Brewster et al., 2006). Hence, it has been argued that efficiencies are likely
to be maximized through collective voice. These arrangements are most likely to be
effective in favourable contexts; participation may lack credibility if security of tenure is
low, and/or wage costs minimized (Kochan and Osterman, 2000).
Figure 1 Forms of voice, participation and involvement
1248 The International Journal of Human Resource Management
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Unions and works councils clearly represent different forms of collective voice. Voice
is externalized through unions; employees opt for a multi-workplace body as their
representative, to bargain on their behalf. In contrast, members of works councils or joint
consultative committees (JCCs) are responsible only to the workers in that workplace
who elected them. It may be argued that the latter form of voice would be more effective
since representatives are more directly accountable to their constituents. Yet greater
indirectness may make for greater strength. Not only are union officials not employed by
the firm less susceptible to victimization (Harcourt et al., 2004), but they can call on
union resources to formulate well-researched bargaining positions, and are better
equipped to make comparisons with other firms’ practices. Hence, it may be that internal
representational voice represents a distinct, inferior (because more limited) form to that
which is externalized to the union (Harcourt et al., 2004; c.f. Millward et al., 2000).
It may, therefore, be favoured by employers as a means of weakening collective
bargaining and the union role more broadly.
The relationship between JCCs, Works Councils and Collective Bargaining is dealt
with in a separate paper by the authors. There, it is noted that JCCs and statutory works
councils were associated with a union presence in liberal market and collaborative
economies (Brewster et al., 2006). There was no evidence that, over time, workplaces
with a JCC were associated with a diminishing union presence. As British WERS
findings show, JCCs often co-exist with collective bargaining (Kersley et al., 2005).
Hence, in this paper, we concentrate on the effects of individual voice on collective
voice, the possible trajectory of change from one to the other, and whether there is a
trans-national convergence to particular configurations of voice mechanisms.
Institutional complementarity and employee voice
Hyman (2004) argues that voice represents one feature of broader regulation of the
employment relationship. Hence, the relative efficacy and sustainability of a particular
voice mechanism is bound up with other systemic social and economic features. A central
feature of national business systems is the manner in which governance is conducted
within and beyond the firm. Thus, mutually reinforcing forms of voice may coexist in
some systems, optimizing employee wages and working conditions, productivity and
organizational performance (Hubler and Jirjahn, 2003). In other systems, inherent tensions
between different forms of voice exist, with particularly strong pressures towards
individual forms of expression (Bryson, 2004). As Hopner (2005) notes, countries such
as Germany and Sweden, characterized by strong labour market institutions,
have highly organized governance within the firm; these have been referred to as
stakeholder orientated or cooperative varieties of capitalism, as opposed to Anglo-Saxon
shareholder-oriented varieties (Dore, 2000; Hall and Soskice, 2001). These authors argue
that employers and employees may vary the degree to which they choose to invest in the
firm; labour through skills and organizational commitment, and management through
reinvestment and building cooperative arrangements. This encompasses the extent to
which employers and employees are mutually dependent through formalized rights and
obligations, and the presence and nature of mechanisms aimed at fostering employee
participation (Dore, 2000; Whitley, 1999). A defining difference between different
varieties of capitalism in terms of HR practice is the nature and degree of employer–
employee interdependence (Whitley, 1999). Firms operating in cooperative contexts are
more likely to make use of collective and representational forms of participation, with
different forms of representative participation often being complementary (Thelen, 2001).
The situation is summarized in Figure 2.
Brewster et al.: Collective and individual voice 1249
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In Germany, strong legal support for co-determination institutions remains, supporting
both employee commitment and unions’ positions. Unions have retained a central position
in the polity, thanks also to strong institutional mediation and mobilization capacity
(Turner, 2004: 6); this is similarly the case in Sweden (Lindeberg et al., 2004).
Nonetheless, external pressures – including challenges posed by employers in the context
of globalization – makes such institutional support vulnerable in these countries (Lane,
2000; Lindeberg et al., 2004: 282; Turner, 2004: 7). Indeed, union density declined
in Germany through the late 1980s and 1990s, although this in part reflects a function of
Figure 2 Institutional complementarity in different settings
Notes: c.f. Dore (2000), Lincoln and Kalleberg (1990), Hall and Soskice (2001)
1250 The International Journal of Human Resource Management
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German reunification; actual membership increased (Behrens et al., 2004: 19). Public
discussion of ‘labour market reform’ in Germany has nevertheless increasingly centred on
a supposed need to remove ‘rigidities’. Employers call for works councils to be allowed
to make agreements without union approval (Lane, 2000; Singe and Croucher, 2005),
thereby seeking to disarticulate key elements of the IR system. Lindeberg et al. (2004: 282)
suggest that, in Sweden, the employers’ confederation SAF has set the terms of public
discussion with similar arguments since the 1990s. In short, both Germany and Sweden
have seen liberal market ideas used to question existing arrangements without these having
been translated into significant state interventions to change the system’s fundaments.
In the UK, unions lost much strength in the Thatcher years, reflected in a loss of
overall membership, and declining union density (Turner, 2004: 6). The lot of unions has
improved somewhat under New Labour – union density has now stabilized at around
30 per cent – but gains have been limited, fragile and vulnerable to renewed
governmental attacks (Turner, 2004: 7). The Labour government has passed three major
statutes – the Employment Relations Acts of 1999 and 2002 and the Employment
Act 2002 in a re-ordering of employment law which does ‘not unduly constrain
managerial prerogative’ (Smith and Morton, 2004: 1). After the data reported on in this
paper were collected, the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004
were passed, although this is relatively weak legislation (Hall, 2005). Thus, the wider
institutional supports for unions in the UK remain limited, ensuring that union-based
collective voice remains vulnerable.
Convergence, divergence and difference
A growing body of literature has explored whether HRM practices within firms are losing
their national distinctiveness (cf. Weber et al., 1998). It has been suggested that there
are inevitable global pressures towards weak regulation, low commitment and weak
organizational citizenship (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 2001). The gradual global diffusion
of the US model is posited (cf. Locke et al., 1995). Convergence theories recognize the
persistence of variations, but suggest that, over time, they will be of diminishing salience.
Convergence theories hold that differences in management systems associated with
different national historic paths have been superseded by the logic of technology and
markets, held to require the adoption of universally applicable management techniques
(Kidger, 1991). Convergence theories tend to assume that management practices are
exclusively driven by a desire to maximize technological or economic efficiency; only
limited attention is accorded to the specific socio-political context (cf. Kerr, 1983).
It was suggested in the early 1990s that convergence in the EU towards a shared
alternative to the US model was likely (Due et al., 1991). However, considerable
diversity clearly persists within Europe. A lack of evidence for convergence might
suggest either stasis or divergence, in both cases underscoring the embeddedness of
national institutions (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; Poole, 1986).
The US HRM model includes a weakening of the collective basis of employee voice,
and a shift to individual voice, geared towards enhancing productivity, rather than
workplace democracy (Weinstein and Kochan, 1995). The US economy’s relatively
strong performance in the 1990s and early 2000s fuelled international interest in US
management practices. Moves by many national governments towards labour-market
deregulation, the global decline of organized labour, and the spread of neo-liberal
ideologies all suggest that the environment has become more favourable for the diffusion
of the US model, leading to the gradual supplanting of collective voice mechanisms by
individual ones. However, in Europe forms of collective and representative voice are often
Brewster et al.: Collective and individual voice 1251
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entrenched by law and norms: most notably in the Netherlands, Denmark and Germany,
firms are required to have two-tier management boards, with employees having the
right to representation on senior supervisory boards (Slomp, 1998). The EU remains
committed to enhancing the role of ‘social partners’, as reflected in its promulgation of
European Works Councils, the Information and Consultation Directive and the European
Companies Statute.
Divergence theories
Institutional divergence accounts have long suggested that national contexts do not
respond readily to the imperatives of technology, the market or largely permissive
legislation from supra-national bodies, reflecting the embeddedness of institutions
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; Meyer and Rowan, 1983;
Oliver, 1991). MNCs, anxious to maintain their image in host countries, may help to
maintain this situation. Thus, surveys show US companies to be highly observant of
German law in the industrial relations field (Singe and Croucher, 2005).
The complex range of forces at work underscores the different possible ways in which
convergence or divergence may occur. Convergence may be towards an emerging new set
of common practices, or in line with a specific set of practices within a particular country.
There may be evidence of a trend in a particular direction or the final convergence of
practices among the overwhelming or simple majority of firms. Therefore, it is possible
to refer to directional convergence as distinct from final convergence. The latter is the
type of convergence most commonly assumed in the literature, although it is often
confused or conflated with other forms, possibly reflecting a limited use of longitudinal
studies. Similarly, divergence may simply reflect the persistence of difference – this may
be stasis – or, alternatively, a centrifugal tendency.
Statement of hypothesis
In sum, the varieties of capitalism literature suggests that within cooperative varieties of
capitalism, mechanisms of employee voice are likely to include centralized bargaining,
co-existing with and reinforcing other forms of representative voice, such as works
councils. In contrast, in liberal market systems, collective bargaining is less likely to
coexist with other voice mechanisms, which tend to be direct and individually orientated.
There is little doubt that the variety of voice mechanisms has increased; however, the
tendency to convergence (of whatever variety) is less clear, although it is commonly held
that the predominant pressures are towards the liberal market model (see O’Hagan, 2002;
Streeck, 1995). Hence our hypothesis:
Hypothesis: There has been a general trend away from collective and towards
individual voice mechanisms, reflecting the predominant trajectory of
managerial practices towards convergence with the liberal market
model.
Method
Data
The data employed in this paper are from the repeating Cranet survey, which now
contains evidence on human resource management policies and practices within private
and public sector organizations in 22 European countries (Brewster et al., 2004).
The survey asks of the most senior HR professional a range of questions on company
1252 The International Journal of Human Resource Management
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policies and practices in the HR area. Technical details of the survey are discussed by
Brewster et al. (2004). The dataset used is from the UK, Germany and Sweden and covers
all four waves of the Cranet survey, i.e. 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2003, collectively giving a
total sample size of 8,844 firms. These three countries are three of a small number from
the original Cranet survey remaining within the project throughout. Consequently, making
use of these three countries enables analysis to be undertaken across the longest possible
period. These data are probably the best available at organizational level, and allow our
longitudinal analysis to be brought close to the present in relation to the issues in hand.
The data for each country are representative with respect to size of industrial sectors by
employment, with each subsequent cross-sectional wave being adjusted to reflect changes
in the relative size of industrial sectors. Hence the sample remains representative across the
whole period considered. The study has inevitable limitations. Our data principally reflect
the position in larger companies employing over 200, workplaces where collective voice
mechanisms are most likely to be prevalent. Data combining employees’ perceptions with
those of managers would be very welcome to provide a control on managers’ perceptions,
but the latter remain key respondents for any study. The survey did not cover smaller firms
(those with less than 200 employees). Given that in almost all national industrial relations
systems, there are significant differences in practice between them and their larger
counterparts this would constitute a fertile area for future analysis.
Mean company sizes in the three countries are for Britain 3,532; for Germany 5,774
and for Sweden 2,272 employees. In terms of unionization, companies both recognizing
a union for collective bargaining purposes and containing at least some union
members amounted to 71 per cent of the companies in the UK, 84 per cent in Germany
and 95 per cent in Sweden. These are clearly higher rates of unionization than generally
reported for these economies; the dataset contains a high proportion of unionized
companies, and is, therefore, suitable for testing our hypothesis concerning the
relationship between collective and individual voice since collective voice is widely
present, although not exclusively so.
The model
The basic propositions are that there has been a trend away from collective and towards
individual voice mechanisms, with countries converging in terms of voice mechanisms.
Employees communicating with management through a trade union or a JCC/WC is used
as the indicator of collective voice. Communicating through workforce meetings, team
briefings, suggestion schemes and attitude surveys is used to indicate individual voice.
It is to be expected that the decision to use collective and/or individual voice mechanisms
reflects the environment in which the firm operates as well as the nature of its operations.
The chosen voice mechanism is likely to be dependent upon two key factors. The first
is the size of the firm, since larger organizations may tend to opt for more formal forms of
voice (e.g. collective bargaining, works councils) than potentially informal voice
mechanisms (e.g., general meetings) and smaller firms for less formal ones. This is not to
suggest that all forms of direct and individual voice are informal; for example, workforce
surveys administered by email may be highly structured. However, collective voice
mechanisms such as works councils, JCCs and collective bargaining are likely to be
relatively formal. This is because of the binding nature of many agreements, the relative
complexity of negotiations, and the need for representatives to be accountable to their
constituents. They may, therefore, be more likely to be encountered in larger firms.
The second is industrial sector, since the typical mode of operation in each industry is
likely to be more, or less, conducive to individual voice. Therefore in order to test the
Brewster et al.: Collective and individual voice 1253
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two basic propositions empirical models are estimated. These use the presence of
communication through trade unions or JCC/WCs on the one hand and workforce
meetings, team briefings, suggestion schemes and attitude surveys on the other separately
as the dependent variables with size and industrial sector as the explanatory variables.
For each country a series of binomial logit models are estimated of the form:
Probð yi ¼ 1Þ ¼ exp ðb
0xiÞ
1 þ exp ðb0xiÞ
where yi is the use of communication through first trade unions or WC/JCCs, second
through the other methods (1 ¼ yes and 0 ¼ no), xi is the vector of explanatory variables,
in this case size measured by number of employees and a set of dummies to identify
15 different industrial sectors and b their estimated coefficients.
The first dimension of the hypothesis, that there has been a trend away from
collective and towards individual voice, is tested by pooling all four waves of data,
then estimating the probability of communicating through collective and individual
means for each country. The hypothesis suggests that there should be less individual
voice, and more collective voice in the first wave, as well as more individual voice, and
less collective, in the last wave, in all the countries under review. Therefore, a
likelihood ratio test is applied to formally test if the use of individual voice is
significantly lower in the first wave and significantly higher in the last wave, and vice
versa for collective voice.
The second dimension of the hypothesis proposes that the predominant trajectory of
these changes have been towards the liberal market/Anglo Saxon model, with the
individualization of practices becoming widespread through the 1990s and 2000s. This
requires that the data for all three countries is pooled. Then for 1991 and 2003
separately the empirical models are estimated, but on this occasion a set of dummies are
included for each country with the UK as the reference category. If the convergence
hypothesis holds, the differences between the countries should reduce over time, and
the coefficients on the country dummies should be smaller in the latter wave as the
countries converge.
Findings
In order to test the hypothesis, communicating with management through a TU or
WC/JCC is used as the indicator of collective voice and using team briefings, workforce
meetings, suggestion schemes or attitude surveys are used as indicators of individual
voice. Table 1 below gives raw figures for each of these measures. The hypothesis would
suggest that there should be a reduction in collective voice and a rise in the use of
individual, but the reduction in collective voice only appears to be the case in the UK
while there is evidence of increased use of individual voice particularly through attitude
surveys and suggestion schemes.
The hypothesis also suggests that the three countries should be converging towards the
liberal market/Anglo-Saxon model. Figure 3 maps the use of collective voice through
JCC/WCs or trade unions over the period considered, and reveals that there has been no
real convergence. Sweden has maintained a high level of use throughout, while the UK
and Germany were initially moving away from collective voice, but in more recent
survey waves have returned to levels similar to the initial survey. In short, the use of
voice method is not moving in a simple convergent direction and is subject to
contingencies that in terms of method (other than team briefings) Germany and the UK
appear to share but Sweden does not.
1254 The International Journal of Human Resource Management
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Table 1 Use of voice mechanisms, 1991–2003
UK Germany Sweden
1991 1995 1999 2003 1991 1995 1999 2003 1991 1995 1999 2003
% Using TUs or JCC/WC’s 82 78 71 77 90 94 93 92 95 99 99 98
% Using workforce meetings 69 80 81 83 79 94 92 94 n/a 99 99 99
% Using team briefings n/a 86 89 93 n/a 74 76 75 n/a 96 99 98
% Using suggestion schemes 47 58 52 54 67 73 70 72 57 92 84 75
% Using attitude surveys 44 59 53 64 36 54 59 65 55 71 79 84
Observations 1,483 1,204 981 895 906 638 526 301 289 285 317 331
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Figure 4 maps individual voice through the incidence of workforce meetings. In this
case it suggests a certain amount of convergence, with Sweden maintaining almost total
coverage throughout while the UK and German display a large increase in its prevalence.
Figure 5 maps the use of team briefings. Use has remained high in Germany and
Sweden, and has increased considerably in the UK. Use in Germany peaked in 1999
and fell away again in the 2003 survey. Thus, there is no support for the hypothesis that
the first two countries have converged towards the Anglo-Saxon/liberal market model.
Some differences are likely to result from disparities in company characteristics and
their environments, in this case between their organizational sizes and the industrial
sectors in which they operate. Therefore, we next estimate the likelihood of voice
occurring through collective or individual means as a function of size and industrial sector.
This is done by estimating a series of logit models with communication through trade
unions or JCC/WCs, workforce meetings and team briefings as the dependent variables.
In order to test the first sub-hypothesis, the models are estimated separately for each
country using all of the available years. A likelihood ratio test is then applied. This
simply tests that the structure of the model is the same in the earliest year as well as in the
latest year. The hypothesis suggests that there should have been greater use of individual
voice mechanisms, and less use of collective, over time. If that were the case, the null
Figure 3 Changes in the use of collective voice: 1991–2003
Figure 4 Changes in the use of workforce meetings, 1991–2003
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hypothesis of the model being the same in both periods should be rejected in all cases.
The results are summarized in Table 2.
Applying the likelihood ratio tests indicates a different picture in each country. First,
Sweden displays a high level of coverage for most of the modes of communication and
this remained consistent throughout the period. However the evidence does indicate a
significant increase in the prevalence of suggestion schemes and attitude surveys.
Second, the UK has followed the implication of the hypothesis fairly closely, with a
decrease in collective voice, although it has increased again in the most recent survey.
In addition, there is strong evidence of an increase in workforce meetings,
suggestion schemes and attitude surveys as well as some evidence of an increase in
team briefings in the UK. Finally, Germany shows very clear evidence of an increase
in the prevalence of workforce meetings, suggestion schemes and attitude surveys but no
other significant changes.
Testing the second sub-hypothesis requires estimating the models with all the
countries’ data included and adding country dummies to control for cross-country
differences. The models are estimated for the first available year and then re-estimated
using the 2003 data. In all cases, the UK is used as the base country, the confirmation of
our hypothesis being that the impact of the German and Swedish dummies on the model
should have fallen over the period considered. The results are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3 records the marginal effects of the country dummies on the model. Thus, for
example, once controls were used for differences in size and industrial sector, firms in
Germany were 11.4 per cent more likely in 1991 to use union or JCC/WC channels than
similar firms in the UK, with this falling to 5.3 per cent by 2003. This supports the second
sub-hypothesis, as it indicates that German and British firms are becoming increasingly
similar over time in terms of their behaviour. However, beyond this there is very little
support for the sub-hypothesis. None of the other changes, apart from German use
of workforce meetings, reach any level of significance. Therefore, the second
sub-hypothesis cannot be confirmed or rejected outright; there is little evidence of a
general trend towards convergence by Sweden and Germany, but it seems that the latter
may be infusing some aspects of the liberal market model. However it could be argued
that that there is simply a different picture in each of the three countries. Sweden
Figure 5 Use of team briefings, 1991–2003
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Table 2 Structural test results
Category Country Structural test LR test stat. Outcome Observations
Communication through TU or WC/JCC UK 1991 vs. 1995–2003 19.0 Accept 1483 vs. 3080
UK 2003 vs. 1991–1999 33.6 Reject at 1% 895 vs. 3668
Germany 1991 vs. 1995–2003 10.0 Accept 906 vs. 1465
Germany 2003 vs. 1991–1999 4.4 Accept 301 vs. 2070
Sweden 1991 vs. 1995–2003 3.6 Accept 289 vs. 933
Sweden 2003 vs. 1991–1999 8.8 Accept 331 vs. 891
Communication through workforce meetings UK 1991 vs. 1995–2003 135.6 Reject at 1% 1483 vs. 3080
UK 2003 vs. 1991–1999 49.0 Reject at 1% 895 vs. 3668
Germany 1991 vs. 1995–2003 112.0 Reject at 1% 906 vs. 1465
Germany 2003 vs. 1991–1999 25.6 Reject at 1% 301 vs. 2070
Sweden 1995 vs. 1999–2003 12.4 Accept 289 vs. 933
Sweden 2003 vs. 1995–1999 8.0 Accept 331 vs. 891
Communication through team briefings UK 1991 vs. 1999–2003 24.0 Reject at 5% 1483 vs. 3080
UK 2003 vs. 1991–1999 19.4 Accept 895 vs. 3668
Germany 1991 vs. 1999–2003 19.8 Accept 906 vs. 1465
Germany 2003 vs. 1991–1999 9.0 Accept 301 vs. 2070
Sweden 1991 vs. 1999–2003 18.8 Accept 289 vs. 933
Sweden 2003 vs. 1991–1999 12.0 Accept 331 vs. 891
Communication through suggestion schemes UK 1991 vs. 1999–2003 57.8 Reject at 1% 1483 vs. 3080
UK 2003 vs. 1991–1999 26.8 Reject at 5% 895 vs. 3668
Germany 1991 vs. 1999–2003 26.0 Reject at 5% 906 vs. 1465
Germany 2003 vs. 1991–1999 10.4 Accept 301 vs. 2070
Sweden 1991 vs. 1999–2003 60.1 Reject at 1% 289 vs. 933
Sweden 2003 vs. 1991–1999 19.4 Accept 331 vs. 891
Communication through attitude surveys UK 1991 vs. 1999–2003 39.8 Reject at 1% 1483 vs. 3080
UK 2003 vs. 1991–1999 72.0 Reject at 1% 895 vs. 3668
Germany 1991 vs. 1999–2003 27.4 Reject at 5% 906 vs. 1465
Germany 2003 vs. 1991–1999 32.6 Reject at 1% 301 vs. 2070
Sweden 1991 vs. 1999–2003 41.2 Reject at 1% 289 vs. 933
Sweden 2003 vs. 1991–1999 26.8 Reject at 5% 331 vs. 891
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continues on a steady path with broad and comprehensive use of all of the
communication methods, while Germany and the UK are indeed converging.
Conclusions
This article has subjected national-level theories to organizational-level longitudinal
analysis. We analysed the extent to which there has been a trend within organizations
operating in Britain, Germany and Sweden towards use of individual rather than
collective voice practices between 1991 and 2003. Our analysis gives the convergence
argument some limited support in that German organizations, controlling for differences
in size and sector, show a decreasing tendency to use their works councils. The finding is
noteworthy since the German model has considerable wider significance for Europe.
Nevertheless the data overall provide little support for the argument that convergence has
occurred in a general sense, despite increasingly vociferous calls by neo-liberals for the
greater individualization of employment relations in Western Europe. The direction of
change has certainly not been linear. During the 1990s, the UK and Germany were
initially moving away from collective voice, but have since returned to levels similar to
those observed in 1991, apparently demonstrating a return to the use of collective voice
by managers in both countries. This de facto return to these channels sits uneasily with
much contemporaneous managerial rhetoric in both countries. However, collective voice
is a broad term that goes well beyond trade unionism and encompasses different
representational forms, processes and outcomes. Dundon et al. (2004) argue that voice
represents a contested process shaped by both external regulatory pressures and internal
managerial choice and suggest that it is critical to look at how well such mechanisms are
embedded within the organization (Dundon et al., 2004: 1167). It may be that the return
to collective voice masks a shift in the content of voice processes towards more
managerially-driven forms, a possibility that would require case study work to evaluate.
It was argued at the beginning of this paper that efficiencies are likely to be maximized
through collective voice structures, and on this argument the results are positive. This
central finding about a lack of directional convergence between countries should be seen
against the background of the apparently more robust performance of liberal market
economies in the early 2000s, and any demonstration effects at the organizational level
that this might suggest. It appears clear that collective channels remain significant in
larger organizations, a finding encouraging both to trade unions and proponents of other
forms of collective voice such as works councils.
Table 3 Marginal effects of country dummies
Category Year Marginal effects Marginal effects
Germany Sweden
Communication through TU or WC/JCC 1991 .1141 (.0165) .1463 (.0326)
2003 .0529 (.0141) .1454 (.0262)
Communication through workforce meetings 1995 .1078 (.0179) .2755 (.0329)
2003 .0651 (.0175) .2170 (.0232)
Communication through team briefings 1995 2 .1302 (.0188) .1184 (.0313)
2003 2 .1156 (.0156) .1043 (.0255)
Communication through suggestion scheme 1991 .1212 (.0208) .0470 (.0293)
2003 .1510 (.0345) .1951 (.0339)
Communication through attitude surveys 1991 2 .0114 (.0210) .0337 (.0318)
2003 2 .0393 (.0274) .1497 (.0309)
Brewster et al.: Collective and individual voice 1259
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The findings have two main theoretical implications. The first is that researchers in the
‘regulation school’ (such as Boyer, 2004) who have argued that national systems
continue to evolve according to a ‘path dependent’ logic specific to each country appear
to be largely correct. The second is that ‘universalist’ US paradigms of HRM centring on
the elimination of conventional collective voice mechanisms have only made limited
headway in Western Europe; both collective bargaining and Works Councils remain key
aspects of the industrial relations system in cooperative economies.
However, as noted above, there is evidence that the German system has been subject
to some individualization of voice; most notably, there has been increased diffusion of
direct forms of communication, most notably in the form of general meetings. This
provides support for more pessimistic assessments of the current state of the German
system of co-determination (Hassel, 2002). This is, in turn, of wider concern for the fate
of the ‘European model’ of voice arrangements as propagated by the EU. Effective
extension of the model to the new entrant states, at least in its stronger German form, may
appear problematic if that form is in Germany itself in retreat not only on the political but
also the organizational level.
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